Leaving $700s/Yr to Buy an Underperforming Printing Business | Dominick Smith Interview
Open on YouTube ↗Dominick Smith left a high-six-figure private credit career at Ares Management at age 29 to buy Print Moz, a large-format e-commerce printing business (banners, signage, decals, stickers) in Southern California, closing in February 2025. He paid approximately $2.8m all-in — a low multiple of roughly 3x SDE — after renegotiating about $1m off the asking price when he discovered the seller had miscategorized $500k in asset sale proceeds as revenue. The business was digitally native with strong organic SEO, brand-new capital equipment running at low utilization, proprietary automation connecting the website to back-end production, and 60% gross margins, but had been starved of sales attention and had a website so slow it was unusable in parts of the country. Dom's growth playbook centered on personally calling customers to uncover unmet print needs, re-engaging a large 110-location jewelry retailer the prior owner had turned away, winning municipal government bids, and eventually hiring a dedicated salesperson — driving roughly 30–50% YoY revenue growth by mid-2026. He burned money on several failed marketing experiments (email marketing, a lifecycle consultant, a HubSpot implementation) and found blue-collar people management unexpectedly demanding. Dom views this as the first of several planned acquisitions, intends to sell Print Moz once he has a demonstrable track record, and sees this period as the defining stretch of his career.
Deal facts
- purchase price
- ~$2.8m all-in (with fees, expenses, and lease payment)
- multiple
- ~3x SDE (low multiple, driven by messy financials and underperformance)
- sde ebitda
- SDE $1–1.1m stated; go-forward entry EBITDA viewed as ~$800k
- revenue
- ~$3.5m (originally marketed at $3.5m top line; two $250k asset sales improperly included as revenue)
- financing structure
- SBA 7(a) loan ~$2.45m (Huntington Bank) + ~$150k seller note + ~$350k equity (approx. 85% SBA / 5% seller note / ~12% equity)
- notes
- Originally listed at $3.6m on ~$1.3m earnings; Dom renegotiated ~$1m price reduction after discovering $500k in asset-sale proceeds miscategorized as revenue. Additional $40k out-of-pocket lease payment at closing. Negative net working capital (paid upfront by customers, net payment terms with suppliers). Bought February 2025.
Why this business
Dom was industry-agnostic and searching in Southern California for a business around $1M EBITDA. He initially dismissed printing as a dying industry but took a closer look after seeing the business was digitally native and e-commerce-oriented — a niche (large-format printing) that analysts noted was stable or growing, unlike traditional commercial printing. He had prior exposure to FastSigns through his work at Ares and recognized that e-commerce was actually a tailwind for this business model. He liked the strong organic SEO rankings, brand-new capital equipment running at very low utilization, a trustworthy seller with clear personal reasons to sell, and significant identifiable upside from underinvestment in sales, marketing, and the website.
What's working
- Fixing website speed (server upgrade) immediately improved conversion rates — the prior owner had tried to save ~$100/month on servers, causing slow load times across parts of the country
- Proactive customer outreach: Dom personally called existing customers, learned their businesses, and consistently uncovered additional print needs — converting 30–50% of outreach calls into upsells or new work
- Re-engaging a large jewelry retailer (110 locations) that the prior owner had turned away — fast-turnaround, complex multi-location pack-out work became a significant growth driver and identified as a repeatable niche
- Winning a municipal bid (Santa Monica Big Blue Bus Transit Authority) — first bid submitted, won aggressively but profitably; projected to be ~10% of annual revenue
- Hiring a dedicated salesperson at the start of 2026 — after a short ramp, revenue is up ~30% YTD through April and trending toward ~50% YoY in May (potential record month)
- Strong cash flow from negative net working capital (customers pay upfront; net payment terms with raw material suppliers)
- Business was operationally self-sufficient with proprietary software connecting the e-commerce front end to ERP back-end production flow — allowed Dom to focus on growth rather than firefighting
- 60% gross profit margins confirmed in line with pre-acquisition modeling
What's hard
- Website underperformance was not obvious until Dom specifically investigated — the prior owner never realized the site was nearly unusable in parts of the country
- Wasted significant marketing spend early on: ~$13k on email marketing that generated only ~$1k in revenue; a lifecycle/retention marketing consultant at $7,500/month for 3 months produced only slide decks with no implementation; a HubSpot CRM implementation that ballooned to ~$15k and ultimately failed
- Temptation to throw money at problems (imported private equity habits into a small business context) — learned that no third party cares as much as the owner and that deep personal involvement is essential before delegating
- Managing blue-collar employees is a fundamentally different skill from managing high-pedigree finance analysts — emotionally demanding, requires acting as therapist and mediator
- Day-one employee threatened to leave unless given a raise, creating immediate pressure
- Commoditized industry makes differentiation difficult and competing on price is a constant challenge
- Tariffs on Chinese raw materials (vinyl, petrochemical derivatives) hit early in ownership, raising input costs
- AI-enabled competitors (e.g., automated print storefronts using Printify-style fulfillment) are eroding the technical moat of being digitally native — requires ongoing attention
- J-curve trough after hiring salesperson: visible cost before revenue materialized, creating uncertainty
- Loneliness and aimlessness of operating without a board, partners, or a formal mentor
- Admits to some deal fatigue bias — was aware in retrospect he had a bias to close after a long search, which influenced his risk tolerance
Notable quotes
I wasn't necessarily really tied to or benefiting from the hard work that I was putting in while I was at Ares. It was very transactional, obviously. It was, you know, when you do a groundbreaking record deal, it's always on to the next one.
If there are kind of 101 issues you cannot through normal means get comfortable with, you have to be scrappy and you have to get in the weeds and figure out how to get the answers that you need to be comfortable to move forward because without having that conversation, if I just — I wouldn't have closed the deal without at least having some sort of communication conversation with that customer. It's just too much risk.
No one is going to care as much as you do. And the more informed that you are, maybe you eventually outsource it to a third party or hire and delegate whatever the responsibility is to somebody else, but it's going to be impossible for you to manage or track or really, you know, fundamentally understand what and how people are doing their work unless you go through the process of understanding it yourself.
People might not think that printing is the most exciting industry, but I find it extremely exciting because it's mine.
I chose to go the more risky path, but you know, you — I know it's cliché, but you only live once... I had a fork in the road and I chose to go the more risky path.
