JD Hasley·June 2, 2025

How to Grow Revenue 50% in Year 1 | JD Hasley Interview

JD Hasley is a former commercial real estate lender (most recently at Crestline Investors in Fort Worth) who, in April 2024, bought Uptown Frame — a high-end custom frame shop in an affluent Dallas neighborhood — for $645,000 at a 2.6x SDE multiple (~$245k adjusted SDE) using an SBA loan of $600k and ~$120k equity alongside his brother as a minority investor. The business had survived decades including the GFC and COVID, and JD saw significant untapped opportunity in proactive B2B outreach to interior designers, galleries, and auction houses — a growth channel the previous family owners had never pursued. In his first year JD grew revenue roughly 50%, from ~$600k to a $900k+ run rate, by adding a highly experienced manager, launching a new website with an online visualization tool, running Google Ads at an exceptional CAC, mandating sub-30-minute email response times, switching to full upfront payment (eliminating most receivables), and adopting a 'say yes' policy on complex or large projects. By November 2024 the business was semi-passive, requiring only 5-10 hours per week from JD, and the first year produced a levered cash-on-cash return of ~130-140% — fully returning the ~$120k equity. The primary ongoing risk is key-person dependency on a small three-person team, and JD is now evaluating both organic growth (off-site fulfillment, installation services for designers) and potentially acquiring additional businesses outside framing.

Deal facts

purchase price: $645,000
multiple: 2.6x SDE
sde ebitda: SDE ~$245,000 (adjusted, with manager cost included)
revenue: ~$600,000 at acquisition; run rate ~$900,000+ by year 1
financing structure: SBA loan $600,000 + equity ~$120,000 (including closing costs and initial website investment)
notes: Negative cash conversion cycle; customers pay upfront before materials are ordered. Brother is minority investor/co-buyer. Business: Uptown Frame, Dallas, TX.

Why this business

JD wanted a simple business with good reputation, impeccable location, and enough cash flow to replace his corporate salary of $130-150k base. He was drawn to framing because the business had survived the GFC and COVID, had strong margins for retail, was in an affluent Dallas neighborhood, and he saw an untapped B2B opportunity in outbound marketing to interior designers, galleries, and auction houses that most frame shops ignored.

What's working

50% revenue growth in year 1, from ~$600k to a $900k+ run rate, with recent months hitting ~$90,000/month
Rapid email responsiveness (within 30 minutes) generating significant B2B inbound from executive assistants and designers — competitors may take days or never respond
New website with online visualization tool allowing customers and designers to preview framing options from thousands of samples without visiting the store
Google Ads with a cost-per-conversion of ~$27-28 against an average ticket of $550+, well below the acceptable CAC threshold
Hired a manager with 20 years of big-box framing experience who reorganized the shop, runs the front, and enabled JD to step back to semi-passive (~5-10 hours/week) by November-December of year 1
Switched from 50/50 deposit model to full payment upfront, reducing receivables by 80-90% and improving cash conversion cycle
Location in a dense, affluent Dallas neighborhood with strong demographic tailwinds in a growing DFW market
'Say yes to everything' mentality — taking complex, large, or fast-turnaround projects competitors decline
Two-week turnaround versus industry standard of four to six weeks
Culture and compensation: salaried manager (not hourly), discretionary year-end bonus pool tied to performance, transparency on numbers, employee empowerment
Levered cash-on-cash return of ~130-140% in the first year, returning all equity invested

What's hard

First three to six months were extremely intense: JD was doing framing himself, managing the shop solo 50-60% of the time, working until 11:30 pm or midnight, while his wife gave birth to their first child one month after closing
Key person / key employee risk is the single biggest ongoing risk — the entire business depends on a very small team of three people
Fort Worth to Dallas commute (one hour each way) added friction during the hands-on phase
Talent pool for experienced framers is thin; JD had to proactively reach out on Indeed rather than just post and wait
Business is heavily consumer walk-in dependent; commercial/B2B recurring revenue is still only ~20% of the mix, below the 30-35% target
Physical capacity constraint of 912 sq ft will require an off-site fulfillment facility if growth continues
Previous owners ran receivables loosely; ~$45-50k in pre-close receivables with $5-10k that were never collected

Notable quotes

I was running the store for 50 to 60% of the time by myself. And so, taking orders, doing fulfillment in the back, the big problem, doing fulfillment. You were doing framing. Yeah. Killed it.

She's the reason this business is as passive as it is now.

We get a lot of email inbound. This is a big part of the B2B. Like, we'll get executive assistants from, you know, financial companies who be like, 'Hey, my boss was mentioned in this newspaper. Can you get me a quote?' And we're emailing within 30 minutes. Other frame shops it'd be like three days if they even have an email address at all.

Besides marrying my wife, you know, one of the best decisions I've ever made.